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The standard tax theory result that investment should not be distorted is based on the 
assumption that profits are locally bound. In this paper we analyze the optimal tax policy 
when firms are internationally mobile. We show that the optimal policy response to increasing 
firm mobility may be taxation, subsidization or non-distortion of investment depending on 
whether the mobile firms are more or less profitable than the average firm in the economy. 
Our findings may contribute to understanding recent tax policy developments in many OECD 
countries. 
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Standard optimal tax theory recommends that small open economies should not
impose source-based taxes on the normal return to capital if capital is internation-
ally mobile (Gordon (1986), Sinn (1990)). If capital is taxed at source, investment
is distorted and national welfare declines. The literature has therefore proposed a
whole class of investment-neutral tax systems in which (pure) pro￿ts can be taxed
without distorting the investment decision. These proposals are often summar-
ized under the label ￿ consumption tax systems￿ . The main characteristic of these
investment-neutral corporate tax systems is that tax payments are zero if the pro-
ject return merely equals the cost of capital. In technical terms, the present value
of depreciation allowances (PVDA) is equal to 100% of the purchase price of the
capital good.
In 1982, the unweighted average of the PVDA for an investment in plant and
machinery across a large number of OECD countries1 was 81%, the PVDA for
industrial buildings 48% (Devereux, Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002))2. With the excep-
tion of Ireland, no country allowed for immediate depreciation or an equivalent in
present value terms, i.e. a PVDA of 100% . Since then, the opening of capital
markets and increasing economic integration among these countries should have
increased the cost of distorting investment.3 In sum, we should have expected
countries to reform their tax system lowering the taxation of the normal return,
i.e. increasing the PVDA.
But, empirical observations do not support the view that governments pursued
this kind of tax policy strategy. Twenty-one years later, in 2003, the unweighted
average of the PVDA has dropped to 75% for plant and machinery and to 33%
for industrial buildings. This means that, on average, countries have taken the
opposite direction of what standard optimal tax theory suggests.
1These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Great Britain,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land and the USA.
2We adopted the calculations with a ￿xed real interest rate (10%) and a ￿xed rate of in￿ ation
(3,5%) in order to keep the numbers comparable across time and countries.
3Of course, source-based taxation is only one level of taxation. Taking into account
intermediate-level and household taxation, it is unclear whether the normal return to capital
is taxed or not, as Gordon, Kalambokidis, Rohaly & Slemrod (2004) show for the US, and
Becker & Fuest (2005) for Germany.
1Using the Corporate Tax Data Base provided by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
(IFS) and described and analyzed in Devereux, Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002), diagram
1 depicts each change in the statutory tax rates and the PVDA4 of the OECD
countries enumerated in footnote 1 in the years 1982-2003. The x-axis measures
changes of the tax rate, the y-axis the variation in the tax base. Data points which
are not on the axes present a simultaneous change of the tax rate and the tax base.
Thus, we get four quadrants among which two are (potentially) revenue-neutral,
because the variation of one tax parameter is ￿￿nanced￿by the variation of the
other one. In addition, as long as the tax system is on the increasing part of the
La⁄er curve, tax reforms in quadrant II are clearly revenue-decreasing and those
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Diagram 1: Tax reforms in di⁄erent OECD countries 1982-2003. Data source:
Devereux et al. (2002).
As the diagram shows, a great deal of tax policy reforms consists of a variation
4The change in the PVDA is calculated as an unweighted average of the changes in the PVDA
of plant and machinery and the PVDA of industrial buildings.
2of either the tax rate or the tax base, i.e. the data points are located on the axes.
Among the tax reforms which changed the tax rate and the tax base at the same
time, only the Canadian tax reform of 1991 follows the way predicted by theory;
however, it just reversed the reform of 1990 to the same extent and may therefore
be interpreted as a mere correction. The only country5 to implement a revenue
decreasing tax reform of both the tax rate and base is Portugal in 1988, whereas the
United States (1992), Finland (1995), France (1996) and Ireland (2002) implement
revenue increasing tax reforms (quadrant IV).
Most tax reforms which changed tax rate and base simultaneously were of the
tax rate cut cum base broadening kind, which consists of lowering the statutory tax
rates on business pro￿ts and reducing the present value of depreciation allowances
at the same time. Among those are tax reforms in Great Britain, Germany and
Japan, and - probably known best - the US tax reform of 1986. It is striking
that even the large countries which could be expected to be relatively autonomous
in their tax policy pursued this kind of strategy. The question arises how this
development can be explained.
Compared to the literature on the e¢ ciency and welfare enhancing e⁄ects of
consumption tax systems, the literature explaining the obvious deviation from this
ideal is relatively scarce. There are basically two approaches to explain this trend.
A ￿rst approach is based on the idea of ￿ policy learning￿ , which is extensively
discussed in the political science literature (see e.g. Steinmo (2003) and Swank
& Steinmo (2002)): Inspired by the fundamental reforms in Great Britain and
the US, policymakers around the world followed their example and adjusted their
tax system to the new model (e.g. see Whalley (1990) and Gordon (1992)). The
underlying assumption is that policymakers do not have an explicit model of the
economy in mind and no clear e¢ ciency goals, but they do observe other policy-
makers and try to copy their strategies when they observe successful ones.6 The
5The recent tax policy reforms in the U.S. are not included in the diagram. As Gordon et al.
(2004) show, these reforms narrowed the tax base by improving depreciation rules for investment
goods, and should therefore be depicted in quadrant II. Combined with various opportunities
of tax exempt savings and the continued deductability of interest payments, this policy ends up
subsidizing the marginal investment.
6Another aspect here is that the US was an important supplier of foreign direct investment
at the time. The foreign tax credit system enables the host country to increase tax rates on US
multinationals up to the US statutory rate without increasing the e⁄ective tax rate for these
3US tax reform of 1986 was considered to be a success in historic dimensions and
could have triggered similar reforms in other countries (see diagram 1).
The second approach is the attempt to explain tax rate cut cum base broad-
ening policy as an optimal response to a changing economic environment. Hau￿ er
& Schjelderup (2000) show that, if multinational ￿rms earn supernormal pro￿ts
and if they may shift these pro￿ts to low tax countries via transfer pricing, it is
optimal to reduce tax rates and broaden tax bases, despite the distortion of in-
vestment caused by this policy. Fuest & Hemmelgarn (2005) show that a tax rate
cut cum base broadening policy may be optimal in the presence of income shifting
through thin capitalization even if there are no pure pro￿ts. Another argument
is provided by Bond (2000) who observes that ￿the increase in the importance of
foreign direct investment ￿ows over the last ￿fteen years or so has been accompan-
ied by corporate tax reforms of this [tax rate cut cum base broadening] type. This
coincidence does not establish any causal link from globalization to tax changes, but
other explanations (...) appear to be scarce￿(p. 173). He proposes to interpret
the tax rate cut cum base broadening to be the optimal tax policy reaction to the
existence of mobile and highly pro￿table ￿rms. Without using a formal model,
he suggests a setting in which multinational companies are assumed to be very
sensitive to the e⁄ective average tax rate whereas investment by immobile ￿rms
is relatively insensitive to the e⁄ective marginal tax rate. Bond concludes that
a government then might increase domestic investment by lowering the statutory
tax rate and accepting a broader tax base, even though this results in a higher
cost of capital.
In this paper, we contribute to the second approach to explain the trend towards
low tax rates and broad tax bases. Surprisingly, the question of how optimal
corporate tax policy looks like in the presence of internationally mobile ￿rms,
has not been investigated yet in a formal model.7 Of course, ￿rm mobility as
such has been extensively analyzed in the literature on foreign direct investment
(Lipsey (2001)) and the new economic geography (see Ottaviano & Thisse (2003)
￿rms. When the US lowered the tax rates fundamentally, other countries were forced to do the
same if they did not want to push the US ￿rms out of the country (Slemrod (2004)).
7As Devereux, Lockwood & Redoano (2004) put it, existing models do not account for the
fact that governments have two instruments, the tax rate and the tax base. Second, these models
ignore other forms of mobility than capital mobility.
4for a survey). There are also several contributions analyzing intergovernmental
competition in corporate tax rates with ￿rm mobility (Boadway, Cu⁄ & Marceau
(2002), Fuest (2005)). But, to the best of our knowledge, this contribution is
the ￿rst to investigate the optimal structure of the corporate tax system in the
presence of ￿rm mobility in a formal model. We analyze this question in a general
framework, where ￿rms di⁄er in pro￿tability and mobility costs. The government
may use the tax base and the tax rate as policy parameters. We show that the
mobility of ￿rms across borders does create incentives for governments to deviate
systematically from investment neutrality. The optimal policy depends on how
pro￿table mobile ￿rms are, relative to immobile ￿rms. If the marginal mobile ￿rm
is more pro￿table than the average ￿rm in the country, a tax rate cut cum base
broadening policy is optimal. The reason is that this policy redistributes the tax
burden from mobile to immobile ￿rms. Thus, mobile ￿rms can be prevented from
leaving the country without losing too much tax revenue. But if the marginal
mobile ￿rm is less pro￿table than the average ￿rm in the economy, a tax rate cut
cum base broadening policy reduces welfare. In this case, the optimal tax policy
consists of subsidizing the normal return to capital and increasing the statutory
tax rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present a
very simple two ￿rm model which clari￿es our argument and the intuition. Section
3 provides a more general model where we analyze a continuum of ￿rms di⁄ering
in pro￿tability and mobility and re￿ne the results derived in the previous section.
In section 4 we discuss the implications of our results and conclude.
2 Optimal tax policy in a two mobile ￿rm setting
Consider an economy with only two mobile pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms, which are
owned by some domestic residents. Both ￿rms di⁄er in pro￿tability. Pro￿tability
depends on ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics, called A, and location-speci￿c character-
istics, called B. Both ￿rms invest in capital ~ K, which is provided by a world




with i = 1;2. The produc-
5tion technology F is well-behaved (FKK < 0 < FK). After-tax pro￿ts are:




￿ (1 ￿ u￿) ~ K (Ai;Bi) (1)











which implies the optimal choice of ~ K. In the following, K without tilde
denotes the optimally chosen ~ K. It is straightforward to show that Ku = @K
@u < 0
and K￿ = @K
@￿ > 0. ￿ = 1 implies undistorted investment.
Firm 1 is assumed to have a high ￿rm-speci￿c pro￿tability A1 and a low
location-speci￿c pro￿tability B1. Firm 2 has a low A2 and a high B2. Roughly
speaking, ￿rm 1 is internationally mobile and ￿rm 2 is not. Mobility means, that
￿rm 1 leaves the country if its after-tax pro￿ts ￿ are smaller than the pro￿ts which
could be earned abroad ￿￿.
The government maximizes the utility of the households according to the social
welfare function
W = U (c) + H (g) (3)
where c is private consumption and g is a publicly supplied good. Consumption
c is the after-tax income of the two ￿rms. g is ￿nanced by the tax revenues.
The government has the choice between two general strategies. The ￿rst is
to levy high taxes, accepting that ￿rm 1 will leave the country. In this case,
the standard result of the taxation of locally ￿xed pro￿ts is valid: Investment is
undistorted and the tax rate can reach 100%.
The second is to choose the optimal tax policy subject to the constraint that













8Any other taxes than source taxes are ruled out.
6where Fi denotes F (Ki;Ai;Bi), subject to
F1 (1 ￿ u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿u)K1 ￿ ￿
￿ (5)
The optimality conditions are:

























W￿ = 0 = (F1 (1 ￿ u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿u)K1)(1 ￿ u) ￿ ￿
￿ (8)
where ￿ is the Lagrangian shadow price. Note that with immobile ￿rms the
optimality conditions are the same with ￿ = 0. In this case, the public good
provision is e¢ cient (H0 = U0) and investment is undistorted (￿ = 1).
With ￿ > 0, it follows from (6) and (7) that the closed economy result H0 = U0,
￿ = 1, u > 0 cannot be an optimum anymore. Therefore try the solution with
undistorted investment but underprovision of the public good (H0 > U0, ￿ = 1,
u > 0).






















(F1￿K1) > 0. The welfare e⁄ect of varying ￿; evaluated
at ￿ = 1, depends on whether the term in square brackets is positive or negative.
To get the intuition, interpret the ￿rst term in the square brackets as the average
return per unit of capital in the overall economy and the second term as the return
per capital unit of ￿rm 1. That means, that ￿ = 1 is an optimal strategy if the
mobile ￿rm is as pro￿table as the immobile one.
However, if one assumes that the mobile ￿rm is more pro￿table than the rest
7of the economy, as does Bond (2000), the term in square brackets as well as the
whole RHS of equation (10) becomes negative. A reduction in the tax allowance
￿, i.e. a broadening of the tax base, leads to a rise in welfare.
How can a distortion of investment lead to increasing welfare? By broadening
the tax base and lowering the tax rate the government redistributes tax liabilit-
ies from the high pro￿ts ￿rm to the low pro￿ts ￿rm. The government can thus
increase overall tax revenues without losing the mobile ￿rm. In other words, the
government equalizes the marginal loss resulting from the investment distortion
and the marginal gain resulting from additional tax revenues.
The opposite case is possible, too. Assume that the immobile ￿rm is more
pro￿table than the mobile ￿rm. In this case, the government wants to redistribute
tax liabilities from the less pro￿table ￿rm to the more pro￿table one. It can do so
by lowering the tax base and increasing the tax rate, i.e. by subsidizing investment.
Such a tax system hits the pro￿table ￿rms harder than the non-pro￿table ones.
The two ￿rm model can be questioned concerning two aspects. First, under
more realistic assumptions, it will probably not be optimal for the government to
keep all ￿rms in the home market. It will rather accept some exits and weigh the
resulting losses in tax revenue against the gains of the remaining ￿rms due to a less
distorting tax system. Second, by distorting the tax system the government might
drive out ￿rms which are immobile and just break even under an undistorted tax
system.
We therefore consider a more general model with a continuum of ￿rms.
3 A more general model
3.1 Firms
Consider an economy with a continuum of mobile pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms, which
di⁄er in pro￿tability. A and B are now independently distributed parameters with
A ￿ fA￿;A+g and B ￿ fB￿;B+g, where A￿ and B￿ can be negative.
The ￿rm decides not to produce if
￿ (A;B) < 0 (11)





for a given B. In addition, ￿rms can decide to change the production location and
go abroad. In this case, ￿rms have to bear the migration cost C which is equal
across ￿rms. Without loss of generality, we normalize location-speci￿c pro￿tability
abroad to zero. Suppose that the foreign government sets its tax rate to t and the
rate of depreciation allowances to ￿. The ￿rm stays in the home country if
￿ (u;￿) ￿ ￿
￿ (t;￿) ￿ C (12)
where the asterisk denotes the foreign country and. Ah denotes the vector of
￿rm speci￿c pro￿tabilities which satisfy ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ C.
3.2 Households
Domestic households own all ￿rms in the economy. Pro￿ts are their only source












￿ ￿ C]dAdB (13)
with
￿ = F (K;A;B)(1 ￿ u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿u)K (14)
￿
￿ = F (K
￿;A;B)(1 ￿ t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)K
￿ (15)
3.3 Government
The government uses pro￿t tax revenue to ￿nance the public good g. The budget






u(F (K;A;B) ￿ ￿K)dAdB (16)
The government is supposed to maximize the social welfare function W:
W = U (c) + H (g) (17)
9As a benchmark case, consider ￿rst the optimal tax policy with respect to the
tax rate and the tax base when ￿rms are immobile.
3.4 Optimal tax policy with immobile ￿rms





















(1 ￿ u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿u)K = 0 (19)
for every given level of B. Figure 1 shows the two-dimensional pro￿tability












Figure 1: Immobile ￿rms.
The ￿rms in the shaded left bottom corner are not pro￿table enough and do not
produce. Firms in the white area do produce and can be taxed. Firms along the Al
frontier are indi⁄erent between producing and leaving the market. By increasing
(lowering) the e⁄ective tax burden, the government shifts the Al frontier to the
lower left (upper right).
The optimality conditions with respect to u and ￿ are:
10@W
@u
























































The solution is the well-known result, that investment should not be distorted:
￿ = 1, knowing that in this case it is FK ￿ ￿ = 0 and F l ￿ ￿Kl = 0. The
government sets the tax rate so that the marginal utility of the public good equals
the marginal utility of private consumption: H0 = U0 (Samuelson condition).
3.5 Optimal tax policy with mobile ￿rms
Now assume that Al < Ah < A+, i.e. there are some ￿rms which will produce
















Figure 2: Mobile ￿rms.
In addition to the ￿rms which are not pro￿table enough to produce at all
(bottom left), there are now ￿rms which prefer producing abroad (top left). Only
￿rms in the non-shaded area produce domestically an can be taxed by the domestic





































(1 ￿ t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)K
￿ ￿ C(24)
The optimality condition with respect to u is:
@W
@u







































The optimality condition with respect to ￿ is:
@W
@￿





























































dB 6= 0 (27)
Second, u has to be greater than zero to satisfy @W
@u = 0. This can be explained
as follows: The ￿rst term on the RHS of equation (25) is strictly positive, the
three other terms are strictly negative. Therefore, u = 0 and u < 0 are no possible
solutions.
Can u > 0, ￿ = 1, H0 > U0 be an optimum?
12@W
@u












































As demonstrated in the appendix, given @W


















where ￿ r = F￿K
K is the average return per capital unit of all ￿rms operating





is the average return per capital unit of the ￿rms


























uKdAdB > 0 (31)
is some scale factor.
How can (30) be interpreted? First, if the covariance term is equal to zero,
(30) does not di⁄er qualitatively from the result in the simple two ￿rm economy.
De￿ne the marginal group of ￿rms as those ￿rms which are just indi⁄erent between
staying and leaving the country. If the average marginal ￿rm is more pro￿table
than the average non-marginal ￿rm in the economy, the optimal tax policy is to
set ￿ < 1 (tax rate cut cum base broadening). If the two groups do not di⁄er in
average pro￿tability, the tax system should not distort investment (￿ = 1). If the
average marginal ￿rm is less pro￿table, the tax system should subsidize investment
(￿ > 1).
13Second, the covariance measures the correlation between the pro￿tability (Fh￿Kh
Kh )
and the elasticity of the marginal ￿rms with respect to ￿, weighted by the tax base
(
￿
F h ￿ Kh￿
dAh
d￿ ). To get the intuition, consider the following example: Assume
that pro￿tability increases in B. Assume further that the response of the Ah-￿rms
rises with B as well. In this case, the covariance term is positive. That means
that, even if the average marginal ￿rm pro￿tability is equal to the average overall
￿rm pro￿tability, the optimal strategy is a tax base with ￿ < 1. The reason is
that among the marginal ￿rms the highly pro￿table ￿rms react more elastically to
tax base changes.
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
The analysis in the preceding section has shown that, under simple assumptions
on ￿rm mobility, the e¢ ciency property of undistorted investment in the optimal
tax system vanishes. How do our results relate to the literature, and what policy
implications do they have?
First, our results question the standard result that a consumption tax system is
desirable when capital is internationally mobile. The mobility of ￿rms is a plausible
assumption and plays an important role in policy debates around the world. Our
model shows that a consumption tax which leaves the marginal investment untaxed
is the optimal policy response only in the special case where the marginal ￿rm
(which is indi⁄erent between staying and moving) is exactly as pro￿table as the
rest of the economy.
Second, our model can be understood as part of the literature that explains
observable ine¢ ciencies in tax systems by the lack of appropriate instruments. In
the presence of internationally mobile ￿rms the government would like to discrim-
inate between mobile and immobile ￿rms. In this model we assumed that the
government faces informational or political constraints and has no means to do so.
Note that relaxing the assumption that the tax rate has to be equal for every
￿rm in the economy would allow for discrimination of ￿rms according to their mo-
bility. It is straightforward to show that the optimal tax policy (i.e. maximization
of social surplus) would imply investment neutrality. The government would then
set individual tax rates for each ￿rm such that each ￿rm with a mobility above a
14certain threshold is indi⁄erent between staying and moving, i.e. for each of these
￿rms equation (24) holds.
In a setting where the government lacks the appropriate instruments for per-
fect discrimination, a tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy can be optimal.
Other examples of this literature are the paper by Hau￿ er & Schjelderup (2000)
and Fuest & Hemmelgarn (2005), as discussed in the introductory section. Os-
mundsen, Hagen & Schjelderup (1998) describe a world in which the government
cannot observe mobility of ￿rms but can o⁄er two di⁄erent tax contracts. They
show that mobile ￿rms will choose the type of taxation that distorts marginal
investment. The distortionary tax system is accepted in order to overcome in-
formation problems. Hong & Smart (2005) show that tax havens can be e¢ ciency
enhancing because they allow mobile ￿rms to lower their e⁄ective tax rate without
leaving the country in which they produce.
Third, of course, our results depend on strict assumptions as does every styl-
ized model. It would be interesting to see if our results hold if ￿rm mobility is
allowed to interact with the opportunity of pro￿t shifting via transfer pricing or
thin capitalization, or with foreign ￿rm ownership. Furthermore, we could ask
what happens when governments have other tax instruments like wage taxes, sales
taxes and so on. In reality, the present value of depreciation allowances and the
cost of capital di⁄er per capital asset; it is tempting to ask how this observation
￿ts to our results. We leave this to further research.
We may conclude that the optimal strategy when ￿rms are internationally mo-
bile can be taxation, subsidization or non-distortion of the marginal investment.
The results depend crucially on the pro￿tability of the mobile ￿rms relative to the
average of the overall economy. In any case, the tax burden is redistributed from
the mobile to the immobile ￿rms. Our results may contribute to understanding re-
cent tax policy developments in many OECD countries. Both the tax rate cut cum
base broadening strategy as well as the subsidization of the marginal investment
can be interpreted as optimal policy responses to growing ￿rm mobility.
155 Appendix
This appendix shows how to derive equation (30). First, recall equations (23) and





























F (Ah;Kh) ￿ ￿Kh
￿
(32)



















FAl (Al;Kl)(1 ￿ u)
< 0


































































































































































































































with ￿ r = F￿K
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